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DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF MAIN ACTORS 
 
The Czech Consolidation Bank (“Česká konsolidační banka, a.s.”, since Fall 2001 
“Česká konsolidační agentura” hereafter referred to as “KOB” or “CKA”, as 
applicable) – a  financial institution owned by the Czech Ministry of Finance, 
established for the purpose of managing State assets.  
 
The Revitalization Agency (“RA”) – a special purpose vehicle wholly-owned by 
KOB established for restructuring, managing and eventually selling certain 
manufacturing firms with substantial debt and equity exposure to the State.  KOB 
hired a professional manager, Lazard/Latona to oversee the Agency 
 
Lazard Freres – a multinational investment bank.  Lazard created a joint venture with 
Latona Associates of Europe to manage the RA 
 
Latona Associates of Europe – a merchant banking group based in the United States. 
One of the joint venture partners hired to manage the RA 
 
The Manager – a joint venture between Lazard Freres and Latona Associates 
established to manage the RA, also known as Odien Restructuring Services. 
Czech Ministry of Finance – responsible for and owner of KOB and therefore also the 
RA.   
 
Lazard/ Latona
Companies
Manager
100%
100%
Assets
(Debt and Equity)
RA
KOB/ CKA
Ministry of Finance
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the late 1990s and the beginning of following decade, the Czech government 
designed and implemented an innovative industrial restructuring program for eight 
of the country’s most significant, distressed manufacturing companies, as part of a 
plan to address the widespread financial insolvency of many of the Czech Republic’s 
largest industrial companies and the need to bail out, recapitalize and privatize some 
of its largest banks.   
 Operating in a challenging political environment, the independent, 
professional management of the country’s Revitalization program worked to enhance 
the value of the state assets in its care.  However, ultimately, the program’s success 
was undermined by political interference from the outset, and eventually was shut 
down. The government continued to proceed with the restructuring work of the 
companies in the program, albeit on a more costly, ad hoc basis. 
 The discussion below describes the events leading up to the creation of the 
Revitalization program, the philosophy behind its design and some of the key 
strategies and techniques used to safeguard and generate value for the state.  The 
RA’s program structure addressed independence and supervisory issues; promoting 
transparency, while providing for government oversight and audit.  However, it also 
provides an illustration of the problems and difficulties that can occur when 
attempting to address the political influence exerted by interest groups. 
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THE CZECH CONSOLIDATION BANK AND 
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 1990’S 
 During the first half of the 1990s, the Czech Republic did not employ standard 
instruments of explicit, rule-based, regulated industrial policy because this would 
have contradicted the “laissez faire” approach favored by the then right-of-center 
cabinet. This does not mean, however, that no action in the industrial policy sphere 
was taken during this period. In fact, a number of state interventions were approved 
by the cabinet and executed through a special purpose financial institution: The 
Czech Consolidation Bank (“Česká konsolidační banka, a.s.”, since Fall 2001 “Česká 
konsolidační agentura” hereafter referred to as “KOB” or “CKA”, as applicable).   
 KOB was established in 1991 by the former Federal Ministry of Finance as a 
state monetary institution operating under the supervision of the Ministry with a 
limited banking license.1 It was originally established to serve as a “hospital” for 
non-performing loans (“NPLs”) from the State banking sector, and, as discussed 
below, it later became the main receptacle of assets from the bail-out of the country’s 
banking sector in the late 1990s.  Especially beginning in 1996, the KOB also started to 
support and finance large manufacturing enterprises through the allocation of credits 
(soft loans) to companies that were not able to receive loans from other banks. 
 With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that these costly interventions were not 
successful. Many Czech enterprises, especially those privatized through voucher or 
coupon privatization (or those auctioned off to budding local entrepreneurs who 
were able to purchase their companies by borrowing acquisition funds from local, 
semi-privatized banks) suffered from low work productivity, low competitiveness, 
over-employment and a lack of capital. In fact, many companies during this period 
stayed afloat only thanks to government assistance and the unofficial soft loan policy 
of the country’s large local banks (themselves partially privatized through vouchers).  
Nevertheless, despite this substantial direct and indirect state aid, the economic and 
financial performance of these enterprises did not improve. State aid all too often did 
not facilitate the effective restructuring of the recipient enterprises, and left the Czech 
taxpayer footing the bill for the companies’ poor financial performance.   
 The reasons for the lack of success were many, varied, and systemic.  For 
example, corporate governance of companies privatized through coupons or 
vouchers was typically weak and there were deficiencies in the legal framework 
(especially bankruptcy law and banking regulation).   With respect to KOB, however, 
one can generalize that the bank’s officers were not trained, rewarded, encouraged or 
instructed to operate using sound commercial banking and lending principals; nor 
were they able to generate the reform and restructuring measures that would have 
1 The bank was divided into Czech and Slovak parts after the country’s “Velvet Divorce” in 1993. 
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ensured an end to future financial reliance on the government.  The bank’s 
importance in the Czech economy nevertheless continued to increase.  According to 
published reports by 1998, KOB was the second biggest bank in the country in terms 
of equity capital, and the fifth largest in terms of assets, becoming the main 
instrument for government economic intervention and its invisible, unofficial 
industrial policy.  
 
ECONOMIC DETERIORATION DURING THE SECOND HALF 
OF THE 1990’S 
 The weak microeconomic underpinnings of the Czech economy became 
apparent in the mid-1990s as the trade and payment balances of the country 
deteriorated rapidly.  This in turn resulted in an attack against the local currency, the 
Czech koruna, during the spring of 1997, a significant increase in interest rates, and 
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime by the Czech National Bank. These 
negative economic developments were further aggravated by a political crisis that 
led to the collapse of the then right-of-center coalition government in the fall of 1997; 
GDP growth contracted sharply. The Czech National Bank’s interest rate hike in 1997 
was accompanied by more stringent banking regulation, especially with respect to 
loan loss provisions and recognition of real estate collateral.  
 Under these circumstances, the lack of microeconomic adjustment (i.e. 
improvement) in significant segments of the corporate sector was exposed as 
companies failed to service their debt obligations, and Czech bank portfolios rapidly 
accumulated non-performing loans. This led to a full scale banking crisis by the end 
of the 1990s and a wave of corporate insolvencies, including the acute financial 
distress of some of the country’s largest industrial corporations. The lack of 
microeconomic restructuring in the Czech economy was ultimately reflected in poor 
economic performance during the second half of the decade. From 1996 – 1999, GDP 
grew by less than 0.6 percent per annum (World Bank, 2000).  
 
 Privately Managed Privatization in the Czech Republic 6
THE REVITALIZATION PROGRAM OF THE SOCIAL  
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 
 
UNDERLYING RATIONALE AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF REVITALIZATION  
 The Social Democratic government (left-of-center), which came to power in 
June 1998, faced alarming deficiencies in the capital structures of many of the 
country’s large semi-privatized banks and the de facto bankruptcy of some of the 
country’s largest industrial employers.  Despite anti-privatization election rhetoric of 
the Social Democrats, the new government was forced to quickly confront the 
astronomic cost of recapitalizing the nation’s banking sector, and fairly quickly 
agreed that privatization provided the lowest cost and most effective means of 
dealing with the situation. With respect to the country’s ailing industrial 
conglomerates, however, the government’s preferences and approach were less 
straightforward. Although the Social Democrats declared completion of industrial 
restructuring to be one of their economic policy priorities, and a number of different 
plans were prepared even before the party won the elections in 1998, they faced 
difficulties designing plans to address corporate restructuring in a relatively cost-
effective and efficient manner. 
 
MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE’S REVITALIZATION CONCEPT 
 Among Social Democrats, two versions of a plan called “Revitalization of 
Czech Enterprises” were circulated and supported. The first version was promoted 
by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Miroslav Grégr. Grégr’s plan involved 
massive subsidies, soft loans; tax breaks and credit guarantees to prop up large, debt-
ridden industrial corporations. In February 1999, the Industry and Trade Minister 
submitted his plan to the Economic Council of the government. There were 
unconfirmed reports that the plan was prepared in cooperation with a large 
privatized bank, IPB (whose NPL portfolio was especially dire, and which therefore 
stood to benefit from substantially from Grégr’s plan).  Since IPB had already been 
privatized, it could not count on the financial ability or willingness of its 
shareholders to recapitalize the bank in order to address its tremendous NPL 
portfolio. The Grégr Plan would effectively have recapitalized the bank by 
recapitalizing some of its largest debtors. 
 The original Grégr Plan encountered strong opposition from the then Deputy 
Prime Minister for Economic Policy and Minister of Finance, Pavel Mertlík, who 
primarily objected to the staggering financial cost, obvious moral hazard, and rent-
seeking behavior by bank creditors and corporate shareholders (IPB was both, which 
is why its collapse in 2000 was so significant for the country financially and 
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economically). The resulting compromise reduced revitalization’s scope and 
estimated fiscal costs significantly, and attempted to give the government’s industrial 
policy a more coherent framework.  However, the persistent differences of opinion 
within the ruling Social Democratic party about the scope, structure and approach to 
industrial revitalization, would eventually limit the Ministry of Finance’s ability to 
implement the program it designed and cause the dissolution of the program. 
 
A SECOND REVITALIZATION PLAN 
 The Czech government agreed on a revitalization concept on April 14, 1999 
(Government resolution no. 354/1999). The scheme was limited to a few significant 
companies. The key difference compared to the Grégr Plan was that the Mertlík Plan 
aimed for effective change in ownership based on enterprise recapitalization, seeking 
to emulate the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 11 reorganization procedure.  That is 
to say, the revitalization program’s main purpose was to financially and 
operationally restructure the companies in the program and then to find those 
companies strategic investors. Although it was recognized that it was necessary to 
address KOB’s NPL problem (which grew significantly as a result of the 
aforementioned pre-privatization bail-outs of several of the country’s largest banks), 
the revitalization program was not designed primarily for this purpose.  In fact, the 
large and complex restructuring cases that became part of the program represented 
only 2 - 3 percent of the total value of the KOB’s NPLs.  
 KOB created a wholly owned subsidiary, Revitalizacni Agentura, a.s. 
(hereafter referred to as the “RA” or the “Agency”), and charged it with the 
implementation of the revitalization program. The RA was to acquire the shares and 
debts of companies from the pre-privatized banks for a fair market value, i.e., well 
below book value. The banks’ capital was to be subsequently strengthened with an 
injection from the Government. In the end, however, the Government elected to 
recapitalize the banks through a transfer of bank NPLs to KOB at much higher values 
(60% of face value).  As a result, KOB was unwilling to transfer the assets to the RA at 
fair market value, since this would have entailed the government recognizing an 
immediate accounting loss on the assets it had just purchased from the banks.  This 
would have been politically unacceptable for a number of reasons, including the fact 
that the losses would have appeared in the state budget and therefore would have 
had a substantial impact on the country’s budget deficit.   The unwillingness or 
inability of the KOB to transfer the assets to the RA effectively undermined one of the 
key underpinnings of the revitalization program and compromised the carefully 
constructed independence of the Agency: without control of the assets, the RA was 
reduced to glorified consulting work for the Government, as opposed to independent 
asset management, as discussed in more detail below. 
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THE REVITALIZATION AGENCY’S MANDATE 
 The Revitalization Agency was established in May 1999 with a mandate to 
select potentially viable, large, and distressed companies for its portfolio, purchasing 
their debt and/or equity at fair market value, managing and restructuring these 
assets to minimize fiscal costs, and maximizing revenues from asset sales through 
competitive tenders.  However, in order to maximize the value of the State’s assets 
through the restructuring and sales process, it was decided that the Agency would 
hire a professional manager to run the RA and to manage the restructuring work. 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE RA 
 The retention of a professional manager was a deliberate act aimed not only at 
improving the performance of the financially distressed companies in its care, but 
also to shelter the RA from political interference in its decision making, since it was 
clear that political considerations in the Czech Republic all too often delivered 
extremely poor results at high financial cost. 
 
Outsourced management.  Although the Agency was 100% owned by KOB, and 
therefore it was effectively state-owned, the management of the RA was outsourced 
to a reputable international investment firm. In June 1999, a public tender for the 
RA’s manager was launched. The tender itself was organized in a transparent 
manner to eliminate any allegations of impropriety and/or corruption. The bids were 
evaluated by a team of KOB specialists and external experts retained by KOB, 
including a country director for the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, a US Treasury Foreign Advisory Service official, and a former 
Chairman of the US Resolution Trust Corporation. Records of voting were kept and 
recommendations of the advisory group were submitted to the KOB for approval. 
The tender and the bid evaluation process were considered models of openness.  In 
October 1999, a consortium consisting of Lazard Fréres & Co. LLC, a multinational 
investment bank, and Latona Associates of Europe LLC, a US-based merchant 
banking group, became the Revitalization Agency’s manager (“the Manager”). 
 
Management Services Agreement (“MSA”) 
 The relationships between the Agency, KOB and the Manager, and the 
responsibilities and obligations of the parties, were delineated in a legal document 
called the Management Services Agreement. The Manager was to provide services by 
making available key personnel. The services included inter alia the coordination and 
selection of the candidate companies for revitalization, preparation of restructuring 
plans for the selected companies, and coordination and organization of 
implementation of the plans. Also, the Manager was responsible for general 
administration of the RA, establishment of its procedures and policies, as well as 
preparation of regular monthly, quarterly and annual reports. 
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 The Manager’s remuneration was based on a combination of an annual 
retainer and fees related to restructuring work on the portfolio companies following 
the adoption of restructuring plans. The company specific fees were based on a 
mixture of monthly advisory fees and success fees for completed restructuring 
transactions. The MSA provided for the crediting of monthly fees against success 
fees. This was to ensure that the Manager was motivated based on successful 
restructuring of the companies. 
 
 
THE AGENCY’S CORPORATE BODIES 
The Executive Board consisted of five members, of which three were appointed by 
the Manager and two by KOB. The Manager was entitled to name the Chairman of 
the Board, while KOB had the right to name the Vice Chairman. The Board had 
decision-making authority as per applicable Czech law, with the additional special 
requirement that prior approval by a supermajority of the Investment Committee be 
obtained for any restructuring plans and their amendments as well as any 
transactions exceeding CZK 50 million. 
 
An independent Investment Committee was charged inter alia with the approval of 
the individual restructuring proposals submitted by the Manager. The investment 
committee consisted of nine members, including all the Executive Board members, 
plus four “outside” members recruited from the ranks of independent workout or 
financial specialists. Effectively, the Investment Committee was designated as the 
body which should prevent and resolve conflicts between the parties, especially KOB 
and the Manager, while providing an objective, independent assessment of the 
structure of the individual restructuring plans, including the remuneration of the 
Manager within the context of individual restructuring plans. 
 
The Supervisory Board, which consisted of nine government appointees, was 
responsible for monitoring the RA’s activities, as per applicable Czech law. It is 
important to note, however, that the rights of the Supervisory Board did not include 
the right to change or amend restructuring plans and/or transactions approved by 
the Executive Board (subject, as noted, to prior approval by the Investment 
Committee).  This arrangement was designed to further insulate the Agency from 
interference and meddling by the State in its restructuring work. 
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SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION OF COMPANIES IN THE RA 
PROGRAM 
 The eligibility criteria were deliberately set a) to limit the number of 
companies to a manageable number of significant debtors with far reaching economic 
significance, and b) to avoid hopeless cases which should clearly be closed or solved 
via bankruptcy. The following criteria determined eligibility: 
1. Criterion of national (regional) economic and social significance: the debtor entity 
(including subsidiaries of which it is the majority owner) employs over 2000 
people; 
2. Criterion of a multiplier effect on the Czech economy: the volume of materials, 
work and services purchased from domestic suppliers in the past accounting 
period exceeded CZK 1 billion; 
3. Criterion of improving bank balance sheets: the combined size of the non-standard 
loans from KOB, Česká spořitelna and Komerční banka (two semi-privatized 
Czech banks) exceeded CZK 3 billion;  
4. Criterion of conditional viability: in the last accounting period the debtor was 
EBITDA positive.  
 
Debtors were eligible candidates if they fulfilled at least three of the four criteria. The 
company itself also had to agree with inclusion into the program, and its existing 
shareholders had to accept the prospect of a substantial dilution of their equity 
position. State help was thus conditioned on restructuring, limiting the company 
management and shareholders’ authority and final privatization. The strategy 
therefore was a de facto re-nationalization of the selected companies, if only 
temporarily. 
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PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 
 Based on the above mentioned criteria, the following eight companies were 
included in the RA’s portfolio: 
Table 1: Companies Included in the Revitalization Program (Financial data in CZK 
mil.): 
Company Staff KoB 
NPLs 
Total 
Debt 
EBITDA Largest 
Shareholder 
% Second 
Shareholder 
% 
Aliachem 9 000 2 365 4 971 n.a. Chemapol 23 Aliachem 17 
ČKD 
Praha 
12 
200 
> 3 000 n.a. n.a. Inpro 39 Deutsche 
Bourse 
26 
Spolana 3 275 1 430 3 566 670 FNM 37 Chemapol 
Group 
29 
Škoda 
Plzeň 
14 
042 
> 3 000 n.a. n.a. NERO, s.r.o. 23 Deutsche 
Bourse 
19 
Tatra 3 800 3 600 n.a. n.a. Škoda 43   
Vítkovice  3 131 n.a. 5 297 2 098 FNM 67   
Zetor 2 241 2 120 2 590 95 KOB 50 Motokov 48 
ZPS Zlín 3 400 n.a. n.a. n.a. SIS Fund 21 Česká 
pojišťovna 
19 
Note: Later the company Hutní montáže was also included in the program; Aliachem, ČKD 
Praha, Spolana were handled by KOB with the RA assuming an advisory role without an 
implementation mandate; ZPS Zlin was declared bankrupt and was sold by Latona-Lazard under 
a separate mandate with the bankruptcy trustee. 
Source: World Bank (2000) 
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APPROACH TO REVITALIZATION  
 The general approach to restructuring adopted by the RA in handling the 
largest cases involved several steps:  
 
a) Obtain control over the company 
• Ownership control was achieved through debt-equity swaps (e.g. in the cases 
of Tatra and Škoda, see the Case Study Appendices below).  In the case of 
Zetor, the original ownership position of KOB was consolidated via 
acquisition of shares at a distressed price from the company’s private majority 
shareholder.  
• Gain control over the financial flows of the company through establishment 
of a state-owned, special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) company that entered into 
contract manufacturing with the distressed firm in the program. Osinek, in the 
case of Vítkovice, and RA Traktor, in the case of Zetor, represent cases of the 
use of such special-purpose (“tolling”) vehicles to ring-fence a company’s 
production process.  Tolling vehicles allowed production to continue at 
distressed companies by securing the creditworthiness of the manufacturer’s 
working capital cycle – in effect, carving it out of the distressed company.  An 
SPV, usually with a state guarantee or financing, would contract for the 
purchase of raw materials that would then be processed by the distressed firm 
on a contract fee basis.  In this way, suppliers which might not have otherwise 
wanted financial exposure to the distressed entity could be encouraged to 
continue supplying raw materials for the latter to use in the manufacturing 
process. 
 
 One of the objectives of the use of an SPV for tolling (i.e., contract 
manufacturing) was to strengthen the position of the owner and the largest creditor 
(i.e., the State) in negotiations with the company’s other creditors. Creditors, 
knowing that the risk of bankruptcy and discontinuation of operations of the 
bankrupt enterprise were major concerns for the government, attempted to hold up 
the State by demanding full repayment of their claims upon threat of filing for 
bankruptcy. However, once a tolling SPV was established and financial flows of a 
target company were redirected, the company’s going concern value was effectively 
preserved by securing continuous operations even in the case of a declaration of 
bankruptcy. The State did not face the abovementioned collateral damages from 
bankruptcy and resulting unemployment, and as a result, its bargaining position 
improved significantly.  
 Tolling using an SPV was completely legal since the SPV did not attempt to 
maximize or redirect profits at the expense of other creditors (which is illegal in the 
Czech Republic). As a result, creditors were unable to take legal action against the 
SPV’s activities, their delaying tactics vis-à-vis the government/KOB were 
undermined, and the RA-proposed restructuring measures could be implemented. 
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The tolling concept was an original contribution of the Revitalization Agency to 
Czech finance, and is regarded as one of the more useful ideas to have been 
developed and applied in the Czech restructuring environment to protect large 
industrial enterprises during the work-out process. 
 
b) Debt-equity swaps 
 In the cases of both Tatra and Škoda, debt for equity swaps of the claims held 
by KOB and Česká finanční (another government agency) were implemented to 
obtain control of the companies.  As a non-cash solution, the swaps acknowledged 
that the bad loans inherited from the past could not be repaid from the companies’ 
continuous operations and that recovery in the case of bankruptcy would have been 
close to nothing (average recovery ratios in bankruptcy at that time did not exceed 3-
5% of the face value of the original claim). In fact, market values for the firms could 
(and actually were) realized subsequently from the proceeds from the sales of shares. 
Also, improved balance sheets and reduced leverage led to better standing in the 
eyes of commercial banks, which were then willing to provide operating and project 
financing on acceptable commercial terms. Another benefit of the swaps came from 
improved payment terms from suppliers and customers due to the more solvent 
status (i.e. improved credit-worthiness) of the companies. This in turn reduced direct 
cash outlays on the part of the government.  
 
c) Strengthening working capital 
 Typically, for companies in the RA program, KOB provided financing for 
company operations either indirectly, as discussed (via tolling vehicles such as 
Osinek or RA Tractor), or directly, after debt-for-equity swaps, to ensure sufficient 
degrees of financial stability and managerial control over the enterprises. Also, 
improved payment terms could be extracted from suppliers which received sufficient 
degrees of comfort to do so (SPVs always honored the agreed payment terms and 
were effectively guaranteed by the State). 
 
d) Dealing with other creditors through composition (i.e., settlement) procedures 
 Unilateral debt-equity swaps in most cases would not provide sufficient debt 
reduction for the companies in the revitalization program, and additionally, these 
swaps were excessively costly for the government – effectively giving remaining 
creditors an unwarranted free ride. As a result, composition proceedings (akin to a 
US style reorganization) were initiated in some cases (e.g. Vítkovice and Zetor). In 
the case of Vitkovice, the composition was accompanied by a buyout of small 
creditors by the State in order to aggregate its debt position and secure the approval 
of the composition by creditors. KOB facilitated the process by guaranteeing 
repayment of the claims in the composition up to the agreed value (in both cases the 
legal minimum under the Czech bankruptcy and composition law was a 30% payout 
to unsecured creditors). 
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SCHEME 1:  GENERAL MODEL OF STATE INTERVENTION 
IN REVITALIZATION COMPANIES 
 
 
RA, KOB 
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Operational restructuring 
 In addition to the financing structures and transactions noted above, the 
Revitalization Agency designed restructuring plans also often included introducing 
new corporate management to implement the agreed restructuring plans.  
 
To summarize, the RA’s overall restructuring strategy typically included three 
phases: 
1. Financial restructuring (liability side of balance sheet); 
2. Working capital restructuring (current assets and current liabilities); 
3. Operational restructuring (long-term assets). 
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SCHEME 2: GENERAL RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY 
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RESULTS OF THE REVITALIZATION PROGRAM 
 When assessing the performance of the Revitalization Program, it is 
worthwhile to look at the several possible criteria: 
1. To what extent did the Program and the implementing agency, the RA, deliver 
what was originally expected? 
2. Did the companies included in the Program survive? 
3. What were the total costs and what were the alternatives? 
4. Are there any general lessons applicable to other transition economies in 
general? 
 
1. DEVIATION FROM THE PLAN 
 According to the original structure of the Revitalization Program, the RA 
should have acquired stakes in the participating companies at fair market value. 
Once purchased, the companies would be evaluated and restructured financially and 
operationally before being sold through tenders.  Critically, as noted, the ownership 
of the assets by the professionally managed agency was designed to ensure that 
decisions were insulated from political interference.  
 However, before the purchases could take place, the Czech Government 
decided that the state-owned banks would be recapitalized in a fundamentally 
different manner. Initially, it was expected that banks would sell their bad loans at 
fair market value (recognizing the losses resulting from such transfers in their 
P&L’s).  At the same time, they would create the requisite provisions (i.e. write-offs) 
for their remaining non performing loan portfolio.   
 Instead, large volumes of non performing loans were transferred to KOB at 
inflated prices. While this essentially accomplished the banks’ recapitalization, albeit 
indirectly; it did so at much higher cost than the original alternative.  The net 
benefactors were the banks’ minority shareholders, which did not have to suffer a 
fair, but painful, dilution of their equity.  Instead, the minority shareholders received 
handsome windfall profits.   
 Following the inflated acquisition of the NPLs by KOB, the Revitalization 
Agency could only acquire the NPLs of the participating companies after reappraisal 
marked them down to fair market value. This, in turn, would have resulted in the 
immediate booking of losses by KOB – a political impossibility for the Government 
and its budget. Consequently, the RA was not able to obtain effective control over the 
companies in the program, and was relegated to a purely advisory capacity.  At the 
same time, as a result, the Manager declined to take an equity stake in the RA, 
although there was an interest allegedly in investing in the companies that were 
revitalized at a later stage.  The RA’s activities were thus shortly after the program’s 
inception constrained to a purely advisory, and therefore significantly diluted, role 
compared to the original concept design.  At the same time, the structure put in place 
to insulate the program from political interference was compromised.  
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REVITALIZATION – THE CAUSE AND A VICTIM OF POLITICAL CLASHES 
 As noted above, the revitalization concept was effectively derailed early on 
when the Government opted for an indirect recapitalization of the country’s failing 
banks, and the RA failed to purchase and control the program’s target assets. 
Another factor that contributed to the program’s weakness was the political conflict 
between the Minister for Trade and Industry, Miroslav Grégr, and the Revitalization 
Program’s main architect, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Policy Pavel Mertlík.  
Grégr never did accept the substantial changes to the plan he originally devised, and 
made frequent efforts to extend the program both in terms of the volume of 
resources, as well as the number of companies involved, while at the same time 
having his Ministry assume control of the program. Any failure on the part of the RA 
to live up to initial expectations was immediately seized upon by Grégr to assail 
publicly and privately not only the RA, but also its main political sponsor, Mertlik. 
As Mertlik’s position within the cabinet gradually weakened, so did support for the 
Program in general, and its implementing agency, the RA, in particular.  
 Finally, as a by-product of this infighting, the Agency, which should have been 
equipped by KOB with sufficient capital resources to carry out its activities, soon 
found itself starved for equity by its sole shareholder.  In this way, the Government 
attempted to hang on to an additional lever to influence the activities of the Manager 
and the Program in general. 
 
DISMISSAL OF THE RA AND ITS MANAGER 
 When Minister Mertlík resigned in April 2001, the Program’s days were 
numbered.  Relations between the State and the Manager’s successor, Odien 
Restructuring Services, deteriorated dramatically. The dismissal of KOB’s 
management by the new Minister of Finance, Jiri Rusnok, and their replacement by 
management openly hostile to the Program and to Odien, lead inevitably to the 
termination of the relationship in the Fall of 2001 amidst public accusations of 
incompetence, lack of cooperation and impropriety. In the end, the soured 
relationship led to the initiation of arbitration proceedings by Odien. The lawsuit, 
however, was later settled by both parties. 
 In sum, one of the key objectives of the design of the Revitalization Agency 
was to shield its operations from political interference and pressures from special 
interest groups. This feature of the program was well regarded by international 
financial and development institutions such as the OECD and the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2000). Nevertheless, depoliticized decision-making vis-à-vis 
revitalization project companies came at a price, since it threatened the activities of 
interest groups with influence in political circles. Moreover, and perhaps partially as 
a result, the fact that the RA did not obtain control over the enterprises participating 
in the program, made any insulation from political pressures purely theoretical. 
Ironically, the RA in the end depended directly upon the political support of the 
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Finance Minister for its existence and independence in decision making. Once the 
support vanished, so did the RA. 
  
2. DID THE COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE PROGRAM SURVIVE? 
 The performance and development of four companies (Zetor, Vítkovice, Tatra 
and Škoda Plzeň) that were included in the revitalization program, and where the 
Agency was directly involved in the workout, is reviewed in some detail in the 
Appendices to this document.  
 
3. DESIRED OUTCOMES AND MEASURES OF SUCCESS: WHAT WERE THE TOTAL 
COSTS AND WHAT WERE THE ALTERNATIVES? 
 Clearly, the main political objective behind the establishment of the RA was to 
keep the companies in the program afloat and to avoid the political costs resulting 
from their bankruptcy, including the associated rise in unemployment (which would 
have involved direct fiscal costs). The companies selected were, for the most part, 
simply too big to permit failure for any government that could afford it.  A secondary 
objective was to reduce the fiscal expenses associated with revitalization to an 
acceptable level. Finally, some of the members of the cabinet (most prominently the 
program’s chief architect, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Pavel 
Mertlík) wanted to implement the revitalization program in a transparent manner 
which would win acceptance from international financial institutions, organizations 
and ultimately, the public.  
 As noted in the Appendices, none of the companies involved in the program 
discontinued its operations.  One way or another, all of the companies were re-
privatized. Clearly, the nominal value of the claims, and the acquisition costs paid by 
KOB, were several times higher than the actual revenues from re-privatization. This, 
however, has more to do with the government’s decision to recapitalize the country’s 
failing banks than with the decision to rescue the failing firms. Had the claims been 
appraised at their fair market value as originally intended, we can speculate that the 
acquisition cost would have been around 10% of the face value of the claims (this 
estimate is actually higher than the expected historical recovery ratio of KOB in the 
case of bankruptcy). Under this scenario, the revitalization program would probably 
have ended up with a significant profit – certainly if the proceeds from the sale of 
Vitkovice Steel in 2005 (CZK 7 billion) are included! The impact on government 
finances, however, should be netted of the fiscal cost of the direct equity injections.  
 For the four companies reviewed in the Appendices some detail, one can 
summarize the results as follows: 
• Zetor: total KOB exposure in 2000 was approximately CZK 4 billion.  Of this, 
the bank recovered CZK 310 million from sale proceeds and an additional 
CZK 700 million from the refinancing of the working capital loan plus interest 
income on loan, i.e. recovery ratio over 25%. 
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• Vitkovice: total KOB exposure in 2000 was approximately CZK 6.5 billion, of 
which about 50% has been recovered. This does not include privatization 
revenues from the sale of Vitkovice Steel by Osinek. 
• Tatra: total KOB exposure in 2000 was approximately 4.5 billion, of which 
about 25% was recovered. 
• Skoda: total exposure of KOB in 2000 was approximately 4.5 billion, of which 
about 8 % was recovered.   
 
One can reasonably argue that revitalization proved more effective than ad hoc 
collection efforts of KOB through bankruptcy proceedings. Many creditors, 
certainly at the time of the Revitalization Program’s operation, believed the 
bankruptcy process in the Czech Republic necessitated a complete write-off of their 
claims against the company. To avoid bankruptcy proceedings, a composition 
process was often initiated by the RA to maintain a degree of control over the 
companies (again, composition is akin to the debtor-in-possession principle under a 
US reorganization; creditors take control of the company’s reorganization rather than 
the company being liquidated or sold by a court appointed administrator) even 
though the price paid for control was a hefty 30% payback on the claims of 
unsecured creditors, guaranteed by the KOB. While at first blush this appeared 
expensive for KOB, especially in the case of Zetor, the recovery ratios seem to 
vindicate the strategy. Obviously, another factor which is difficult to compute with 
precision, but certainly should be included in the equation, is the tax revenue 
preserved by the State through several channels. Corporate income tax collected from 
the restructured companies to date has been modest, since they have benefited from 
massive tax shields through tax-loss-carry-forward provisions of the Czech tax code.  
However VAT revenue, personal income tax and social security taxes have been 
significant. 
 
CZECH “REVITALIZATION” WITHOUT THE REVITALIZATION AGENCY 
 The RA’s dissolution heralded a return to the Government’s former bad 
habits, which again resorted to ad hoc bailouts and exposed itself to being held up by 
other creditors and the moral hazard of those large debtors which avoided hard 
restructuring decisions at the taxpayers’ expense. This is not surprising, 
understanding that a bankruptcy framework more conducive to a market-based 
environment is still absent in the Czech Republic. Whereas Vítkovice was essentially 
restructured, its productivity improved, and revenues from re-privatization 
produced a handsome return for the effort, Nová Huť – another large steel company 
previously in better condition than Vítkovice, was still cash-starved not long after its 
ad hoc bailout by the Government outside the RA program framework. Eventually, 
the government’s entire exposure in Nová Huť – 67% of the equity and CZK 4.8bn in 
debt – was sold for CZK 660 mil. to LNM Holdings in 2002. The recovery ratio of 
about 10% is well below that of Vitkovice and comparable to the disastrously 
derailed restructuring case of Skoda, a.s.  
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 The moral hazard illustrations and implications of the government’s non-
systemic approach to the bailouts of failing industrial companies are obvious. The 
Government’s predominantly political, as opposed to economic, decision-making 
before the Revitalization Program (and to some extent after its abandonment) was 
facilitated by the often hidden costs of such interventions. Also, the country’s 
relatively low level of government debt made the interventions possible (i.e. 
affordable) and the markets did not punish this behavior by pushing up interest rates 
on public borrowing. The Government bailouts also evidenced substantial cases of 
rent-seeking, as, for example, in the aforementioned bailout of Nová Huť. Here, 
management, trade unions, and bank creditors colluded with the would-be investor 
to maximize their gain at the expense of the Government, and thus taxpayers. In 
particular, the Government in this case was backed into granting exclusivity to the 
investor by the above-noted cabal of local and international banks when they 
threatened to bankrupt the company just weeks before the country’s general elections 
in June 2002.  In sum, despite its shortcomings, the results of the RA program, and 
the flawed restructuring work of the KOB before and after the program, demonstrate 
the efficacy and potential benefits of moving economic decisions out of the political 
realm.  One can only speculate about the successes the RA might have achieved if the 
assets it was charged with managing were in fact transferred to the Agency – 
allowing the Manager to make decisions in a politically insulated environment. 
 
THE DISCIPLINING EFFECT OF THE EU  
 More recently, the political temptation to prop up failing firms has been 
somewhat suppressed by the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU.  As a result, the 
country’s state aid policy, including bailouts, requires obtaining EU consent (n.b. the 
law on state aid came into force in 2000; the Czech Office for the Protection of 
Competition was charged with reviewing compliance with EU and local EU 
harmonized law). EU accession has also de facto increased the political (as well as the 
financial) costs of the kinds of bailouts that have been part of the Czech economic 
landscape since 1990 – although attempts to seek rents remain far from nonexistent. 
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APPLICABLE LESSONS 
Why are insulation from political interference and transparency important? 
a. What are some of the methods that can be used to achieve transparency and 
independence? 
b. Should the hired a professional manager?  What particular value and skills could   
       an independent manager bring ? 
c. The strengths and weaknesses of the RA. 
 
THE BENEFITS OF INSULATION FROM POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND 
TRANSPARENCY  
 One of the main lessons that can be derived from the Czech Revitalization 
program experience is that corporate governance and contractual arrangements that 
reduce, mitigate and – if possible – eliminate political interference in what is in 
essence an asset management exercise are extremely important preconditions for 
satisfactory performance. The key legal foundation document of the RA, the 
Management Services Agreement, created a governance structure for the program 
that made political interference virtually impossible as long as the parties honored 
and fulfilled their mutual rights and obligations. Financial decision-making for the 
company’s in the Program rested with a professional manager selected through a 
competitive tender.  Decisions concerning remuneration per case and the approval of 
a particular project’s design were in effect in the hands of outside members of the 
Investment Committee selected by both contractual parties for their professional 
skills and integrity. The Investment Committee thus was designed to serve as the 
venue for internal dispute arbitration.  
 In reality, however, even though the restructuring plans for the portfolio 
companies were innovative (perhaps even ingenious for the local operating 
environment) proper implementation remained beyond the RA’s actual ability. Why? 
The RA case presents a powerful argument for sticking to the original plan and 
maintaining the integrity of concept design for the duration of the program. Despite 
the careful efforts of project planners to account for anticipated attempts to assert 
undue influence over the RA’s activities, once the fundamental structure of the 
program was altered (i.e. the RA did not own or control the assets it was charged 
with managing) the Manager found that it not only had to develop plans to rescue 
the companies, but also had to operate in a politically charged environment in which 
special interest groups worked actively to undermine the RA’s activities through 
obvious rent-seeking behavior. 
 Indeed, one can argue that the RA’s achievements were well below original 
expectations, and attribute this directly to the fact that the RA did not own or control 
the assets it was originally supposed to acquire at fair market value. With hindsight, 
it is clear that the RA was predestined to fail from the moment the decision not to 
transfer the assets was taken by KOB and Ministry of Finance, respectively. This 
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effectively precluded proper motivation of the Manager of the RA; diluted its 
responsibility, power and accountability and subsequently gave rise to both justified 
and un-justified criticism of the performance of the RA and its Manager.  
 The fact that there were understandable reasons for KOB and the Czech 
Government to deviate from the originally approved concept embedded in the 
“Management Services Agreement” did little to make relations among the 
contractual parties tenable. In essence, the MSA was rendered obsolete just weeks 
after its signing and the Program’s delicate, sophisticated legal structure became 
dysfunctional as a consequence. It took months of negotiation, and the filing of 
lawsuits, for the parties to finally address their differences.  The time and energy 
used to debate the amendment of the framework, and, later to end it, was something 
the RA could hardly afford, and distracted attention from its core revitalization 
mandate.   
 While, as noted above, one can only imagine what the results of the Program 
would have been if the Manager had been in a position to fulfill its mandate in an 
environment free from political pressure and interference, it is clear that the priority 
the Program’s architects gave to insulating its activities was well justified.  
 
METHODS TO ACHIEVE TRANSPARENCY AND INDEPENDENCE 
• Decisions were taken at the Executive Board level, with independent 
oversight, as opposed to the Government dominated Supervisory Board; 
• Professional integrity of management can be verified by an independent 
internal body to provide a degree of comfort to the government counterparty 
(i.e. the RA went at great lengths to achieve this objective by forming an 
Investment Committee with pre-approval rights on key decisions). The 
autonomous outside directors acted, in effect, along the lines of US non-
executive directors; 
• Records of the projects and any actions taken – including justification of the 
underlying economic rationale–were kept and presented regularly to the 
Government oversight Supervisory Board; 
• The Supervisory Board, as noted, of the RA was comprised of political 
appointees who could – and indeed did – ask for specific explanations 
concerning projects on an ex post basis; 
• The financial accounts of the RA were audited both internally and externally 
by an independent, reputable audit firm; 
• The RA was closely monitored by the government and the media. Due to the 
change in the RA’s concept, all of the projects had to be submitted to the 
Government for approval (significantly, the Government never rejected a 
project proposal with respect to a portfolio company in which the RA was 
directly involved).  At the same time, the required approval of the government 
for RA proposals limited the ability of the Agency to act independently; 
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• Consider posting records of key meetings and documents publicly (on an ex 
post basis); 
 
BENEFITS OF HIRING A PROFESSIONAL MANAGER 
• Experience and know-how unavailable within public sector; 
• Commercial decisions often require specific skills and personality 
characteristics not found among or suited to public staffers and bureaucrats; 
• Reputational capital of the Manager should guarantee and ensure professional 
integrity; 
• Thoughtfully designed remuneration framework should reward success and 
align the manager’s interests with the economic objectives of the asset owner.  
Such compensation schemes are rarely found in the public sector for a variety 
of reasons. 
 
A SUMMARY OF SOME STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE RA 
 
General:  
?        The RA performed its dedicated asset management tasks and did so with a 
clear legal mandate from the Czech Government. 
 
Corporate Governance Level: 
? Ambiguous financial structure – the RA, as a subsidiary of KOB, was 
entirely reliant upon KOB for funding its operating budget.  One of the ways that 
the government attempted to influence and interfere in the RA’s operations was 
by withholding funds. 
? The RA program itself was widely discussed in the news media, the 
complexities of the program and the nature of the dispute between the 
Government and the Manager made it difficult to have an intelligent discussion.  
Instead both sides resorted to mudslinging to try to gain the upper hand in their 
dispute, 
? Although the RA did not have a Code of Conduct, all employees were 
required to read and sign the company’s Operation Manual which specified a list 
of rules and regulations for company employees.  In addition, the reputational 
capital contracting of the outside manager was meant to ensure that high 
professional standards were met. 
? In terms of independence and supervisory issues, the RA’s program 
structure did an excellent job, theoretically, of promoting transparency, while 
providing for government oversight and audit.  The division of the Program’s 
decision-making bodies (i.e. Supervisory Board, Investment Committee and 
Executive Board) and their responsibilities was designed to ensure that the 
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ownership interests of the State and those of the Manager were represented and 
balanced, while, at the same time, ensuring independent management of the 
assets.  The independent Investment Committee, in particular, served as the 
venue for resolving any asset management and restructuring disputes that might 
arise.  Its independent members (approved by both KOB and the Manager) 
served both as arbiters for the two parties, and guarantors that neither side could 
push through decisions or policies without getting approval from a majority of 
the autonomous committee members.  
 
Core Business Level: 
? The retention of a professional manager by the RA was meant to ensure that 
the management and sale of the companies in the revitalization program would 
be competently arranged through transparent, value maximizing processes and 
programs.  Engaging appropriately incented professionals specifically 
experienced in the organization of corporate sales and restructurings was 
intended to ensure that the RA’s core asset management and disposal business 
were run efficiently and effectively. 
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APPENDICES – FOUR EXAMPLES OF COMPANIES INCLUDED 
IN THE REVITALIZATION PROGRAM 
 
Zetor 
Zetor, a tractor company located in the Moravian city of Brno, has a long 
history of government rescue operations: by 1996, its KOB debt burden had already 
been recapitalized twice. In July 1998, another rescue attempt was initiated when 34% 
of the company was sold to Motokov International, a Czech foreign trade company. 
Motokov gained an additional 13.74% of the company’s shares in 1999. The KOB still 
owned 49.9%, but Motokov controlled and managed the company and had an option 
to purchase the remaining shares. However, Motokov was clearly unable to manage 
the company effectively, as it suffered from its own financial problems and most of 
its revenues were derived from Zetor tractor sales. The economic and financial 
situation at Zetor deteriorated rapidly and the assembly lines came to a halt in 1999.  
 There are still debates about whether it was worth saving Zetor at substantial 
cost to the taxpayer. Interestingly enough, this was also the position of the RA 
management, which tried to accomplish the Czech version of a US pre-packaged 
bankruptcy, presenting the plan to the Regional Commercial Court in Brno in Winter 
1999/2000. The Court’s reaction to the plan, however, was openly hostile.  Zetor was 
subsequently included in the revitalization program and the government approved a 
three step plan prepared by the Revitalization Agency to revive the company’s 
tractor production in March 2000.  
1. To protect any working capital facility from the risks of bankruptcy, the RA 
established the subsidiary company, RA Traktor, s.r.o., (a tolling vehicle) 
which applied for and received a CZK 700 million loan from KOB for the 
assembly of tractors for firm export orders insured by the Export Credit 
Guarantee Agency (EGAP). 
2. Motokov sold its shares in the company to the state (for CZK 31 million) and 
the company was thus completely re-nationalized. The KOB gained control 
over the company, and the restructuring process under the supervision of the 
Revitalization Agency began. 
3. There was still the issue of Zetor’s enormous debts which put the company 
under constant threat of bankruptcy.  Following the rejection by the Court of a 
prepackaged bankruptcy, a composition process was started under the 
relevant provisions of the Czech Bankruptcy and Composition Law to settle 
outstanding debts of CZK 6.48 billion. The company proposed to pay off 30% 
of the unsecured claims. Also, KOB issued guarantees up to CZK 800 million. 
The composition was then approved by the creditors in May 2001. In March 
2002, the supervisory board of ČKA approved the sale of the company to HTC 
Holding from Slovakia for CZK 310mil. Today Zetor is a moderately profitable 
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private company and has repaid the CZK 700 million working capital facility 
to KOB in full, including contractual interest. 
Table 2: State Interventions in Zetor (CZK mil.) 
Date Amount Note 
November 
1994 
1 370 Debt-equity swap 
End of 1996 3 700 Capital decrease 
End of 1996 3 686 Shares bought by the KOB 
June 2000 2 656 Capital decrease to pay off the accumulated 
debt 
June 2000 31 Purchase of Motokov’s share by the state. 
August 2000 700 KOB’s credit  
December 2000 800 KOB’s guarantees in compensation 
Source: Kreuzbergova, 2004 
 
Vítkovice 
 Vítkovice is one of the largest metallurgical and machinery conglomerates in 
the Czech Republic.  In 1999, when it faced an acute financial crisis, the company 
employed 14 thousand people. The company defaulted on CZK 9.5 billion in debt, 
and banks refused to provide further financing to keep the loss-making company 
afloat.  Since the company was located in the region already suffering from high 
unemployment (14.4% at that time) the government was desperate to prevent further 
significant job losses. 
 In September 1999, the Government approved a bailout package of CZK 2.8 
billion, consisting of a combination of cash to keep the company going and debt 
write-offs. However, the bailout was not accompanied by any restructuring measures 
and only a few months later, the company was again on its knees, unable to pay 
wages on time and forced to restrict production due to a lack of material inputs and 
working capital. 
 This time, under the auspices of the Revitalization Program, the same 
approach later successfully replicated for Zetor was chosen: a) a ring-fenced 
operational financing (tolling) vehicle was established through an SPV controlled by 
the State’s National Property Fund (Osinek, a.s.), b) operational restructuring was 
initiated by a new crisis management team and c) composition under the Czech 
Bankruptcy and Composition Law was effected to reduce debt to a sustainable level. 
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 The composition process was preceded by the buyout of small creditors by the 
State; the objective being primarily to aggregate the debt position of the State so as to 
reduce hold up opportunities and to prevent rejection of the composition during the 
creditors’ meeting. Creditors approved the composition plan in November 2000 
(again, the legal minimum 30% payoff to unsecured creditors was offered and 
agreed) and the company, as a result, escaped the threat of bankruptcy. The KOB 
guaranteed repayment of the creditors taking part in the composition up to a total 
amount of CZK 3 billion.  
 Subsequently, the company was restructured: the metallurgical subsidiary 
(itself carved out in 2001) was sold first to the NPF-owned Osinek in 2002 (to avoid 
calling in of KOB guarantees), and subsequently to a foreign investor for CZK 7 
billion in 2005. The parent company was privatized to a domestic investor. By mid-
2005, the entire conglomerate had been successfully re-privatized and is producing 
impressive profits for the new investors. 
 
Table 3: State interventions in Vítkovice (CZK mil.) 
Date Amount Note 
September 1999  
 
Autumn 1999 
 
Autumn 1999 
 
 
2 800 
consisting 
of: 
500 
 
600 
 
 
1 700 
Approved by the government  
 
 
Bridge finance facility for wages, working capital 
and other necessary payments 
Česká finanční assumed company claims of CZK 
1.7bn and discharged them for CZK 600 mil. 
 
Debt-equity swap of the KOB claims 
2000 1 000 Česká inkasní´s resources used to settle Vítkovice’s 
creditors 
February 2000 400 Debt in Česká inkasní paid off by Vítkovice 
March 2000 2 800 KOB’s credit to Osinek 
October 2000 700 Claims of Vítkovice’s creditors purchased by Česká 
finanční 
Source: Kreuzbergova, 2004 
 Privately Managed Privatization in the Czech Republic 28
 
Tatra  
          Tatra, a heavy-duty and off-road truck producer, suffered from financial 
difficulties resulting from the dramatic decline of sales to the Russian market 
following the revolution (Russia being by far the largest customer for the company’s 
products in the 1980s). Production almost came to a complete halt in the beginning of 
1999, and the company found itself unable to pay wages in full or service its debt to 
the creditors.  
 In a series of steps, Tatra was effectively renationalized. The KOB bought 
43.5% of the company’s shares from Škoda Plzeň for CZK 140 million and Česká 
finanční purchased 14.97% from investment funds for CZK 55 million. In addition, 
KOB also purchased claims held by Komerční banka with a face value of over CZK 3 
billion for CZK 1.8 billion and provided Tatra with operational credit facility 
amounting to CZK 400 mil. Subsequently, KOB swapped CZK 4.1 billion in debt for 
equity via a subsidiary company of the NPF – Kras Brno. 
 
Table 4: State interventions in Tatra (mil. CZK) 
Date Amount Note 
1999 140 KOB purchases Škoda’s 43.5% stake 
1999 55 Česká finanční purchases 14.97% from investment funds. 
1999 400 KOB provides credit 
2000 4 100 Debt-equity swap of KOB claims 
Source: Kreuzbergova,2004 
With financial restructuring complete, a tender for the sale of Tatra to a strategic 
partner was managed by Latona and Lazard through the RA.  In 2001, an American 
investment company, SDC International, in cooperation with US construction 
equipment maker TEREX, offered CZK 1.25bn for 91.61% of Tatra. Today, the 
company is controlled by TEREX, and operates at a modest profit. 
 
Škoda Plzeň 
 Škoda Plzeň, the country’s largest heavy engineering firm (no relation to 
Škoda automobile, owned by VW), got into serious financial troubles during the 
second half of 1990s. 
In autumn 1999, shareholders decided to substantially decrease capital by 75% (from 
CZK 9.479 billion to CZK 2.369 billion) to write-off the past losses. In March 2000, a 
new company – Škoda Holding, a.s. was founded by Škoda Plzeň and its creditors, 
including KOB, in cooperation with the Revitalization Agency. Škoda Holding 
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acquired 19 operating companies in exchange for promissory notes offered to Škoda, 
a.s. creditors. Through this scheme, the viable operating core of the company was 
ring-fenced from the risk of bankruptcy, and under the law in place at the time, from 
the risk of liquidation. 
 Škoda, a.s. was in fact declared bankrupt in September 2001.  However, Skoda, 
a.s. management and its bankruptcy trustee remained the majority shareholder of 
Škoda Holding, and they successfully used this position to oppose the restructuring 
plans proposed by the RA and effectively to hold up the Government to extract 
various financial concessions and derail the restructuring process. Eventually in 
December 2002, KOB, following the termination/withdrawal of the RA and Odien 
mandates, sold its position in Škoda Holding (48% equity stake) to Appian Group 
(nominally, a Delaware company) for CZK 350 million. The loss of control over the 
restructuring process translated into a low recovery ratio of 8-9% of the face value of 
KOB’s claims. Today, Skoda Holding, a.s. and its operating companies are for the 
most part delivering impressive profits to the private investor, and Appian has sold 
several of the 19 subsidiaries for an aggregate consideration that exceeded KOB’s 
total receipts from its debt and equity interests. 
 
Table 5: State Interventions in Škoda (CZK mil) 
Date Amount Note 
1992 1 888 Debt cancellation  
April 2000 2100 Capitalization of bills acquired by KOB for its claims 
March 
2002 
140 Capitalization of KOB’s (ČKA’s) claims in Škoda Těžké 
strojírentví 
March 
2002 
900 Loss of ČKA from transaction Škoda Steel (debt-equity 
swap) 
Source: Kreuzbergova, 2004 
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